Comments

The PSLRA's Heightened Pleading
Standard: Does Severe Recklessness
Constitute Scienter?
By

IN

CHRISTOPHER J. HARDY*

AN EFFORT to curtail abusive securities litigation, Congress

passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995'
("PSLRA"). In essence, the PSLRA creates a heightened pleading standard requiring a stronger showing of fraudulent intent in order to
bring a securities fraud lawsuit.2 By creating this heightened pleading
standard, Congress attempted to deter frivolous securities fraud lawsuits brought by private plaintiffs, 3 "to protect investors and to main-

tain confidence in the securities markets."' 4 The purpose of the
PSLRA, was to restrict abusive practices such as: (1) filing lawsuits
against issuers of securities in response to any significant change in
stock price, independent of the defendant's culpability; (2) targeting
"deep pocket" defendants; and (3) abusing the discovery process to
5
induce settlements.
This Comment analyzes the definition of scienter 6 for securities
fraud claims and the development of the various pleading standards
* Class of 2001. The author wishes to thank his loving family for their constant and
unyielding support during the last three years.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (Supp. IV 1998) (making the PSLRA part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
2. See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding that the PSLRA
effectively raised the nationwide pleading standard), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 567 (2000).
3. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995).
4. Id.at 31.
5. See id.
6. Scienter is defined as a term
used in pleading to signify an allegation ... setting out the defendant's previous
knowledge of the cause which led to the injury complained of, or rather his previous knowledge of a state of facts which it was his duty to guard against, and his
omission to do which has led to the injury complained of.
BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 1345 (6th ed. 1990).
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for securities fraud under the PSLRA. Part I of this Comment describes the pleading standard prior to the enactment of the PSLRA
and the subsequent development of a heightened pleading standard.
Part II outlines the discrepancy among the circuit courts following the
adoption of the PSLRA. Part III analyzes the statutory language, legislative history, and subsequent legislation attempting to define the
heightened pleading requirement. Finally, Part IV demonstrates that
the Eleventh Circuit has correctly defined the heightened pleading
standard and suggests the uniform adoption of the Eleventh Circuit's
interpretation of the PSLRA.
I.

Background

Plaintiffs may bring federal securities fraud actions under Section
10(b) 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 ("SEA") and the Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") Rule lOb-5. 9 Section 10(b)
of the SEA makes it unlawful for'a person "[t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."' 10 Rule
1Ob-5 makes it unlawful "[t] o make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading . . . in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security."' 1
The required elements of a private securities claim under Section
10(b) are: "1) a misstatement or omission, 2) of a material fact, 3)
made with scienter, 4) on which plaintiff relied, 5) that proximately
caused his injury."' 2 In order to survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted,"'13 allegations of securities fraud must satisfy the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9 (b). 14 Rule 9 (b) provides that "[i] n all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994 & Supp, IV 1998).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000).
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000).
Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999).
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
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particularity."15 Rule 9 (b) further states that " [m] alice, intent, knowledge and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally."1 6 Despite this "particularity" requirement, prior to the PSLRA,
private litigants were able to abuse the securities laws. 17 Some circuits
interpreted Rule 9(b) broadly, allowing plaintiffs to plead the scienter
element of securities fraud actions with mere conclusory allegations.18
However, other circuits required plaintiffs to plead specific facts sufficient to establish a "strong inference" of scienter. 19 In response to
these continued abuses and in an effort to establish a national standard, in 1995, Congress adopted the PSLRA to curb non-meritorious
claims brought under federal securities laws. 20 The PSLRA no longer
21
allows plaintiffs to aver scienter merely with conclusory allegations.
The new pleading standard created by the PSLRA requires that claimants "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 22 However, this
new standard fails to define the requisite state of mind and fails to
describe what is necessary to give "rise to a strong inference" of
23
culpability.
A.

Defining Scienter Prior to the PSLRA

In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,24 the United States Supreme Court
defined scienter as a "mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."2 5 In Hochfelder, a brokerage firm, First Securities
Company of Chicago ("First Securities"), retained an accounting firm,
Ernst & Ernst, to periodically audit the brokerage firm's records and
to prepare documents to be filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.2 6 Customers of First Securities inadvertently invested in
a fraudulent investment scheme promoted by the brokerage firm's
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 37 (1995) (noting plaintiffs alleged scienter
implicitly by alleging facts constituting fraud without any showing of malice or intent).
18. See In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547-49 (9th Cir. 1994).
19. In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting
O'Brien v. Nat'l Prop. Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991)).
20. See sources cited supra notes 3-5.
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1998).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
25. Id. at 194 n.12.
26. See id. at 188.
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president.2 7 In addition to filing an action for damages against the
president, the customers filed an action claiming that Ernst & Ernst
aided and abetted First Securities in a fraudulent scheme to the customers' detriment. 28 The customers argued that Ernst & Ernst's failure to conduct a proper audit and the failure to discover the internal
practices and the fraudulent investment scheme of First Securities
constituted negligent nonfeasance. 2 9 The Supreme Court ruled that
negligent conduct is insufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement for
a Section 10(b) fraud action. 30 Therefore, absent an allegation of intent to defraud, manipulate, or deceive, the Supreme Court clearly
stated that a cause of action under Section 10 (b) of the SEA cannot be
31
sustained.
In Hochfelder, the Court held that "[t]he words 'manipulative or
deceptive' used in conjunction with 'device or contrivance' strongly
suggest that Section 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct. '32 The Supreme Court did not decide whether
reckless behavior is sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement under
Section 10(b), but in a footnote stated that "[i]n certain areas of the
law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for
33
purposes of imposing liability for some act."

In response to the Court's ruling in Hochfelder, every circuit court
began holding that recklessness did fall within the scope of scienter for
Section 10(b) purposes and was sufficient to impose liability for securities fraud. 34 The circuits generally defined reckless conduct as:
a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or
even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of mis-

27.

See id. at 189.

28. See id. at 190.
29. See id. Nonfeasence is defined as "[tihe failure to act when a duty to act existed."
BLAcK's LAw DICTiONARY 1076 (7th ed. 1999).
30. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 210.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 197 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur, Co., 401 F.2d 838, 868 (2d Cir. 1968)).
33. Id. at 194 n.12 (emphasis added).
34. See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999); see also
Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989); Van Dyke v. Coburn Enter., Inc., 873
F,2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (10th Cir.
1982); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir. 1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon
& Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978).
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leading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant
or is
35
so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.
However, the enactment of the PSLRA has caused some disagreement
among the circuits over whether reckless behavior still satisfies the
substantive scienter requirement for the imposition of liability for securities fraud under Section 10(b). 3 6 Additionally, the circuits are divided as to what facts must be alleged to satisfy the procedural
requirements of averring scienter. 37 The substantive requirement of
securities fraud actions refers to the requisite condition of the mind of
the defendant, while the procedural requirement refers to the level of
facts that must be pled to meet this substantive requirement.
B.

Development of the Heightened Pleading Standard

Prior to the enactment of the PSLRA, the circuits were split as to
the requisite pleading standards under Rule 9(b) in securities fraud
cases.3 8 The following cases illustrate the pre-PSLRA differences in the
pleading standards among the federal circuits.
In In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation,39 the Second Circuit
ruled that facts alleged in a securities fraud complaint must "give rise
to a 'strong inference' of fraudulent intent."40 In Time Warner, the defendant, Time, Inc. ("Time"), agreed to merge with Warner Commu4
nications ("Warner") by acquiring all of Warner's outstanding stock. 1
This acquisition caused Time to incur a debt of over $10 billion and
42
forced the company to raise capital through a new stock offering.
Announcement of the new offering caused a decline in the price of
stock from $117 per share to $89.75 per share. 43 The new shareholders brought a securities fraud claim alleging that a series of statements
made by company officials during the new offering period materially
35. Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1977). See
also Byant, 187 F.3d at 1284; In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 976-77
(9th Cir. 1999), rehg denied, 195 F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 1999).
36. See In reAdvanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 531 n.6 (3d Cir. 1999); Bryant, 187
F.3d at 1284 n.21; Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 976-77; see also discussion infra Part II.
37. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 978-79.
38. See In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Time Warner
Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993).
39. 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993).
40. Id. at 268 (alteration in original) (quoting O'Brien v. Nat'l Prop. Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991)).
41. See id. at 262.
42. See id.
43. See id.
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misled investors by misrepresenting the status of the strategic
44
partnership.
In order to satisfy the requirement that the complaint give rise to
a strong inference of fraudulent intent, the Second Circuit recognized
two distinct ways in which a plaintiff may plead scienter. 45 A plaintiff
must either (1) allege facts establishing a motive and opportunity to
commit fraud, or (2) "allege facts constituting circumstantial evidence
of either reckless or conscious behavior. '46 The Time Warner court reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint and remanded
the case for a determination consistent with its interpretation of the
procedural rules. 47 By allowing plaintiffs to allege facts constituting
motive and opportunity, the Second Circuit created the potential for
pleading reckless conduct that cannot be distinguished from negligent conduct. However, according to the Hochfelder Court, such a
showing is insufficient to establish scienter under Section 10(b). 48 At
that time, the Second Circuit's pleading requirement was regarded as
the most stringent pleading standard of any circuit because it required
49
that fraudulent intent be specifically pled, rather than generally pled.
But the facts that must be specifically pled to establish scienter could
50
include facts constituting simply motive and opportunity.
At the other end of the spectrum, the Ninth Circuit failed to
adopt the Second Circuit's view that plaintiffs must plead facts giving
rise to a "strong inference of fraudulent intent."5 1 Rather, the Ninth
Circuit, in In re GlenFed, Inc. Securities Litigation,5 2 determined that
Rule 9(b) does not require "'any particularity in connection with an
averment of intent, knowledge or condition of the mind. '"' 51 In
GlenFed, investors appealed the district court's dismissal of their complaint for failing to plead fraud with particularity. 54 The shareholders
alleged that corporate officers concealed the company's deteriorating
financial condition, lack of adequate internal controls, and declining
44. See id.
45. See id. at 268-69.
46. Id. at 269.
47. See id. at 272.
48. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 (1976).
49. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534 (3d Cir. 1999).
50. See In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 269 (2d Cir. 1993).
51. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1546-49 (9th Cir. 1994).
52. 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994).
53. Id. at 1545 (alteration in original) (quoting Walling v. Beverly Enters., 476 F.2d
393, 397 (9th Cir. 1973)).
54. See id. at 1543.
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market value. 55 The Ninth Circuit ultimately determined that the
pleading met the broad requirement of pleading scienter under Rule
9 (b) and vacated the dismissal.5 6 The court concluded that the second
provision of Rule 9(b) is clear in that conditions of the mind may be
averred generally. 5 7 The court stated that "it shall be sufficient to allege [scienter] without setting out the circumstancesfrom which the same is
to be inferred."58 In effect, the Ninth Circuit allowed plaintiffs to assert
scienter generally by alleging that scienter existed, so long as the
plaintiff pled with particularity the "circumstances constituting
fraud."5 9 Since this pleading standard allowed conclusory allegations
of scienter, the standard was viewed as far less stringent than the Second Circuit pleading standard. 60
In an attempt to reconcile the conflicting pleading standards,
Congress enacted the PSLRA. 6 1 The PSLRA requires that a plaintiff,
"with respect to each act or omission alleged .... state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind."62 The language of this new pleading standard
parallels the Second Circuit's standard. 6 3 Clearly, scienter can no
longer be averred generally as it could under the Ninth Circuit test
enunciated in GlenFed.64 The statutory language of the PSLRA, however, does not define the term "strong inference" nor does it provide
guidance on what a plaintiff must plead in order to establish this
"strong inference." 65 Consequently, the circuits are divided in their
66
interpretations of this new pleading standard.
55.

See id.

56.
57.
58.
59.

See id. at 1554.
See id. at 1545.
Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
Id. at 1547 (emphasis omitted).

60. See Laura R. Smith, The Battle Between Plain Meaning and Legislative History: Which
Will Decide the Standardfor Pleading Scienter After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. Rv. 557, 588 (1999).
61. See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) (Supp. IV 1998) (emphasis added).
63. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) with Press v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d
529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999).
64. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) with GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1545; see also Bryant, 187
F.3d at 1282 (discussing the differences between the PSLRA and the Second and Ninth
Circuit standards).
65. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 1999), reh'g
denied, 195 F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 1999).
66. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1282; Press, 166 F.3d at 538; Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 970.
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H. The Problem: Confusion Among Federal Circuit Courts
Following the Adoption of the PSLRA
Two issues have arisen among the circuit courts as a result of the
1995 enactment of the PSLRA. First, the circuits are divided as to
whether recklessness constitutes the requisite mental state needed to
satisfy the substantive element of scienter as defined by the PSLRA for
purposes of Section 10(b) securities fraud claims. 67 Second, there is
ambiguity as to what a plaintiff must allege in order to satisfy the procedural requirement of stating facts which give rise to a "strong infer68
ence" of the requisite state of mind.
A.

What Mental State Is Sufficient to Satisfy Scienter Under

Section 10(b)?
1. Simple Recklessness
Following the adoption of the PSLRA, most circuits concluded
that some form of recklessness satisfies the scienter element of Section
10(b). 69 However, the circuits have differed in the degree of recklessness required to establish scienter. 71) In Press v. Chemical Investment Services Corp.,7 the Second Circuit ruled that facts alleged in a securities
fraud complaint must give rise to a "strong inference" of fraudulent
intent.7 2 In Press, the Second Circuit determined that simple recklessness satisfied the scienter requirement. 73 The Second Circuit's test explicitly states that a plaintiff may "allege facts that 'constitute strong
74
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.' ,,
In Press, the individual plaintiff had purchased a United States
Treasury bill through a registered securities broker-dealer. 75 The
plaintiff maintained that the defendants committed fraud by failing to
disclose that the funds, at maturity, would not be immediately availa67.
68.

See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1282.
See RobertJ. Giuffra, Jr., PleadingScienter Under the PSLRA, N.Y.L.J, July 22, 1999, at

1.
69. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534 (3d Cir. 1999); Bryant, 187
F.3d at 1282; In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 552-53 (6th Cir. 1999); Press,
166 F.3d at 538.
70. See generally Bryant, 187 F.3d 1271; Press, 166 F.3d 529; Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d

970.
71.
72.
73.
74.

166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999).
See id.at 538 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) (Supp. IV 1998)).
See id.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124,

1128 (2d Cir. 1994)).
75.

See id. at 532.
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ble because of the delay caused by the United States Postal Service. 76
Since "the period over which the yield [on the Treasury bill] should
have been calculated was longer than [the defendant] represented...
[the plaintiff claimed] the yield advertised was .. .fraudulently inac78
curate." 77 The plaintiff filed suit under Section 10(b).

The Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiff had sufficiently
alleged facts establishing that the defendants had an intent to keep
possession of the investor's proceeds and had the opportunity to do so
since the proceeds at maturity were in their control. 79 However, the
court failed to explain how motive and opportunity in this case established reckless conduct.
The Third and Sixth Circuits have also adopted the simple recklessness standard. 0 The Third Circuit, in In re Advanta Corp. Securities
Litigation,8 ' held that all allegations of scienter must be supported
with facts stated with particularity and must give rise to a strong inference of scienter.8 2 The Third Circuit reiterated its previous holding
that reckless conduct, as well as intentional or conscious behavior, re83
mains a sufficient basis for liability under Section 10(b).

In Advanta, the shareholders alleged that Advanta's corporate officers made false and misleading statements and material omissions
regarding the earning potential and value of the company stock. 84
The Third Circuit determined that the PSLRA establishes a safe harbor provision protecting "'forward-looking' statements" 5 from Rule
lOb-5 liability, unless the plaintiff proves that the statements were
made with actual knowledge that the statements were false or misleading.86 Therefore, under this provision, plaintiffs cannot allege reckless
behavior when the claim of fraud relates to forward-looking statements. 8 7 The Third Circuit concluded that the complaint did not state
76. See id. at 533.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 538.
80. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 552-53 (6th Cir. 1999).
81. 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999).
82. See id. at 535 (paraphrasing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) (Supp. IV 1998)).
83. See id.
84. See id. at 528.
85. Id. at 535 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (Supp. IV 1998)).
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(i).
87. See id. A statement is forward looking if it is "a statement containing a projection
of revenues, income (including income loss), earnings (including earnings loss) per share,
capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure, or other financial items." Id. § 78u-

5(i) (1)(A).
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any specific facts to support an inference that any company officer
had actual knowledge of the falsity of the statements and therefore
88
affirmed the district court's motion to dismiss.

In In re Comshare Inc. Securities Litigation,8 9 the Sixth Circuit also
determined that "plaintiffs may plead scienter in Section 10(b) ...
cases by alleging facts giving rise to a strong inference of recklessness."90
The Sixth Circuit noted that "the PSLRA did not change the scienter
that a plaintiff must prove to prevail in a securities fraud case but instead changed what a plaintiff must plead in his complaint in order to
survive a motion to dismiss." 9' Therefore, according to the Sixth Circuit, the substantive scienter requirement of recklessness remained
the same, but the procedural standards for pleading recklessness
changed.
In Comshare, shareholders sued a computer software developer alleging that corporate officers knowingly or recklessly disregarded acknowledged errors in revenue recognition and that, through public
misrepresentations about company revenue, the officers fraudulently
induced the plaintiffs to purchase Comshare stock at artificially inflated prices. 9 2 The Sixth Circuit recognized that the officers had a
motive and opportunity to receive greater compensation if Coinshare's stock prices increased. 93 However, the court held that "motive
and opportunity do not, without more, suffice to give rise to a 'strong
inference' of scienter."9 4 The Second and Third Circuits are of the
view that pleading facts showing motive and opportunity is sufficient
to plead recklessness, while the Sixth Circuit contends that pleading
facts illustrating motive and opportunity alone is insufficient. 9 5 Despite this difference, the circuits agree that the substantive standard of
recklessness remains unchanged. 9 6
2.

Severe Recklessness

In order to satisfy the scienter requirement of Section 10(b), the
Eleventh Circuit interprets the PSLRA to require a high degree of
88. See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 541-42.
89. 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999).
90. Id. at 549 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 548-49.
92. See id. at 547.
93. See id. at 553.
94. Id.
95. See generally In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999); Press v.
Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999). But see Cornshare, 183 F.3d at 553.
96
. See generally Advanta, 180 F.3d 525; Press, 166 F.3d 529.
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recklessness. 97 In a pre-PSLRA decision, 98 the Eleventh Circuit characterized its severe recklessness standard as follows:
Severe recklessness is limited to those highly unreasonable omissions or misrepresentations that involve not merely simple or even
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and that present a danger of misleading
buyers or sellers which is either known to the defendant or is so
obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.9 9
In Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 0 0 the Eleventh Circuit addressed
the issue of whether, under the PSLRA, allegations of recklessness can
still meet the requisite state of mind under Section 10 (b). 10 1 In Bryant,
the shareholders of Avado Brands, Inc. alleged that the chief executive officer and chief financial officer made false and misleading statements and material omissions regarding the company's expansion
strategy and profit margins in order to inflate the value of the com0
pany's stock.1

2

The Eleventh Circuit interpreted the scienter requirement of Section 10(b) to mean that a "plaintiff must plead with particularity facts
which give rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted in a
severely recklessfashion."10 3 The Eleventh Circuit also held that although
allegations of motive and opportunity to commit fraud may, under
certain circumstances, contribute to an inference of severe recklessness, such allegations, without more, are not sufficient to demonstrate
scienter. 0 4 The court in Bryant remanded the case to the district court
for proceedings consistent with the severe recklessness standard and
its ruling regarding motive and opportunity. 0 5 The use of the language "severe recklessness" indicates that the Eleventh Circuit intended the proof requirement to be more stringent than those
circuits allowing simple recklessness to be alleged with facts of motive
and opportunity.

97.
98.
99.
1981)).
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
granted.

See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999).
See McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809 (11th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 814 (quoting Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-62 (5th Cir.
187 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999).
See id. at 1283-84.
See id. at 1274.
Id. at 1285 (emphasis added).
See id. at 1285-86.
See id. at 1287. On remand, the defendants' renewed motion to dismiss was
See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1385 (M.D. Ga. 2000).
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Deliberate Recklessness

The Ninth Circuit has adopted a standard that is the "most defense-friendly" interpretation of scienter under the PSLRA. 1° 6 In
other words, this standard requires the greatest showing of scienter.
07
The Ninth Circuit held, in In re Silicon Graphics Securities Litigation,
that a plaintiff "must plead, in great detail, facts that constitute strong
circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless or conscious misconduct."' 1° 8 As a result, the court held that although facts showing mere
recklessness or a motive and opportunity to commit fraud provide some
reasonable inference of intent, these facts, standing alone, fail to establish deliberate or conscious misconduct. 0 9 In order to demonstrate a strong inference of deliberate recklessness, "plaintiffs must
state facts that come closer to demonstrating intent, as opposed to
mere motive and opportunity."' 1 0
In Silicon Graphics, an investor filed a Section 10(b) securities
fraud class action against corporate officers alleging that the officers
made misleading statements regarding production and sales of the
company in an effort to inflate the value of the company's stock."1 '
12
These officers were alleged to have been engaged in insider trading'
by selling their stock at these inflated prices.1 1 3 The court determined
that the plaintiff's allegations were insufficient to create a strong inference that the officers acted with deliberate recklessness.' 4 The court
reasoned that the allegations were too generic and contained little
5
more than evidence of mere motive and opportunity."1
The court further noted that "Congress intended to elevate the
pleading requirement above the Second Circuit standard requiring
plaintiffs merely to provide facts showing simple recklessness."' 16 According to the court, Congress intended to require something closer
to actual intent as well as to eliminate the motive and opportunity
106. Paul Elias & Ellen Rosen, Circuits Split on Stock Fraud,NAT'L L.J., July 19, 1999, at
BI.
107. 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999), reh'g denied, 195 F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 1999).
108. Id. at 974 (emphasis added).
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 984.
112. The term "insider trading" refers to "[t]he use of material, nonpublic information
in trading the shares of a company by a corporate insider or other person who owns a
fiduciary duty to the company." BrACK's LAW DICTIONARY 798 (7th ed. 1999).
113. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 984.
114. See id. at 988.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 974.
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presumption." 7 The Ninth Circuit explained that allegations contained in the pleading must create an inference of a deliberate or
knowing misrepresentation in order to be distinguishable from "fishing expeditions," where opportunistic plaintiffs target corporate officers selling a significant quantity of shares prior to the company
taking an unforeseeable turn for the worse." i8 The Ninth Circuit does
not presume that scienter is established merely by pleading facts constituting a motive and opportunity to commit fraud. 119
A panel of Ninth Circuit judges recently denied a petition for a
rehearing of the Silicon Graphics decision, and a majority of the nonrecused active judges failed to grant a petition for rehearing en
banc.120 However, a group of dissenting judges, in response to the petition for rehearing, expressed their strong belief that the Ninth Circuit's deliberate recklessness standard, a change in the substantive
Congress"
scienter requirement, is contrary to the "plain directives12of
1
circuits."
fellow
our
with
conflict
and "creates a striking
B.

What Must a Plaintiff Plead in Order to Satisfy the Pleading
Requirement of Rule 10(b)?

1. Establishing Motive and Opportunity Creates a Presumption of
Reckless Behavior
Following the adoption of the PSLRA, several circuits have concluded that satisfaction of either of the Second Circuit's pre-PSLRA
tests is sufficient to establish the required strong inference of fraudulent intent.' 22 In order to satisfy this requirement, the Second Circuit
determined that "a plaintiff must either (a) allege facts to show that
'defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud' or (b)
117. See id; see also Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1284 n.21 (1Ith Cir.
1999) (describing the Ninth Circuit's holding in Silicon Graphics). The Eleventh Circuit in
Bryant was "satisfied that Congress intended to codify the well-established law that some
form of recklessness was included" within the substantive requirements, while only changing the procedural standard. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1284 n.21; see also In re Advanta Corp.
Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525,534 n.8 (3d Cir. 1999); Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 620
(4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the PSLRA did not change the substantive requirements that
a plaintiff prove the defendant acted intentionally, which may be shown by recklessness,
but did heighten the standard for pleading scienter).
118. Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 988.
119. See id. at 974.
120. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 195 F.3d 521, 522 (9th Cir. 1999) (denying rehearing).
121. Id. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
122. See generally In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999); Press v.
Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999).
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allege facts that 'constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness."' 123
The Second Circuit reasoned that " [t] o require more in pleading
of motive . ..would make virtually impossible a plaintiffs ability to
plead scienter in a financial transaction involving a corporation, institution, bank or the like that did not involve specifically greedy comments from an authorized corporate individual."' 124 The Second
Circuit itself continues to follow its pre-PSLRA test that motive and
opportunity are sufficient to establish a strong inference of fraudulent
intent. 125 The Second Circuit seems to lose sight of Congress' clear
intention to deter frivolous lawsuits.
In order to satisfy the scienter requirement, the Third Circuit also
allows a plaintiff to either allege facts showing either: (1) the defendant had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud or (2) allege
facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness. 126 The Second and Third Circuits have concluded that the motive and opportunity test suffices to presumptively
12 7
raise a strong inference of the requisite scienter.
However, a recent Second Circuit case, Novak v. Kasaks,128 seems
to cast doubt on the motive and opportunity prong of establishing
recklessness.129 The court in Novak explicitly stated that it "believe [d]
that Congress's failure to include language about motive and opportunity suggests that [courts] need not be wedded to these concepts in
articulating the prevailing standard."130 Although the Novak court did
not reject its previous ruling in Press, the court, at a minimum, recognized the conflict and alternative approaches in other circuits. The
Second Circuit seemed to disfavor the presumption that alleging motive and opportunity by itself constitutes a showing of reckless behavior, but the motive and opportunity analysis was important to a
finding of reckless conduct. The court stated that "litigants and lower
courts need and should not employ or rely on magic words such as
'motive and opportunity,' we believe that our prior case law may be
123. Press, 166 F.3d at 538 (emphasis added) (quoting Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp.,
Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994)).
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534-35.
127. See generally In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999); Press v.
Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999).
128. 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 567 (2000).
129. See id. at 310.
130. Id.
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579

helpful in providing guidance as to how the 'strong inference' standard may be met.' 1 3 1 On November 27, 2000, the United States Supreme Court denied Kasaks's petition for writ of certiorari to resolve
13 2
the issue.
2.

Motive and Opportunity Does Not Presumptively Raise a Strong
Inference of Reckless Behavior

In contrast, the Sixth and Eleventh circuits have concluded that
the motive and opportunity test no longer suffices to presumptively
raise a strong inference of scienter. 133 In Comshare, the Sixth Circuit
held that "plaintiffs may plead scienter ...by alleging facts giving rise
to a strong inference of recklessness, but not by alleging facts merely
establishingthat a defendant had the motive and opportunity to commit securities fraud."1 3 4 Consequently, plaintiffs may allege facts showing motive
and opportunity to support a finding of scienter, but these facts alone
35
are insufficient to establish scienter.1
In Bryant, the Eleventh Circuit similarly held that plaintiffs must
plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter. 13 6 The court
held that allegations of motive and opportunity may be relevant to a
showing of severe recklessness, but such allegations, without more, are
37
insufficient to demonstrate the requisite scienter.'
3.

Merely Showing Motive and Opportunity Is Insufficient to
Establish Deliberate Recklessness

In Silicon Graphics, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's
interpretation of the PSLRA.138 The Ninth Circuit does not allow
plaintiffs to plead scienter by simply alleging facts establishing that the
defendant had both a motive and the opportunity to commit securities fraud. 13 9 The Ninth Circuit requires plaintiffs to allege facts giving
rise to a strong inference of conscious misconduct or deliberate recklessness.' 40 The Ninth Circuit views the PSLRA as Congress' attempt
131. Id. at 311.
132. See Kasaks v. Novak, 121 S. Ct. 567 (2000).
133. See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 1999); In re
Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999).
134. Comshare, 183 F.3d at 549 (emphasis added).
135. See id.
136. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1285.
137. See id.
138. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999).
139. See id.
140. See id.
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to elevate the pleading requirement above the Second Circuit standard.1 41 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit requires pleading facts evidencing a state of mind resembling intent as opposed to pleading a mere
motive and opportunity establishing simple recklessness.' 4 2
The Ninth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in
Hochfelderas elevating the requisite mental state to deliberate recklessness. 1 43 The Ninth Circuit viewed recklessness as a lesser form of intentional conduct rather than a greater degree of negligence. 14 4
Consequently, it found that the PSLRA altered the substantive requirements as well as the procedural requirement of pleading facts
constituting deliberate recklessness. 145 The Ninth Circuit concluded
that plaintiffs can no longer aver scienter in terms of recklessness but
must state specific facts indicating no less than a degree of reckless46
ness that strongly suggests actual intent.1
III. Analysis
It is critical to reconcile the inconsistent interpretations of the
PSLRA by the various circuits. The PSLRA must be applied uniformly
in securities fraud actions in order to effectuate Congress' intent to
curtail frivolous and abusive litigation. 14 7 Our securities markets include corporations that are located in many states and that conduct
business across the nation. Issuers of securities should not be subject
to varying pleading standards depending on the circuit in which a par1 48
ticular plaintiff chooses to bring suit.

After a careful analysis of the statutory language, the congressional intent, and the congressional history of the PSLRA, it becomes
clear that the Eleventh Circuit provided the most accurate interpretation of the PSLRA in Bryant.
A.

Statutory Language

In order to resolve the conflict among the circuits regarding the
proper pleading requirements and the substantive definition of scien141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See id.
See id. at 976-77.
See id. at 977.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See supra sources cited and text accompanying notes 3-5.
See sources cited supra notes 2-5.
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ter, an analysis of the language found in text of the PSLRA is the most
appropriate starting point. The PSLRA provides, in pertinent part:
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant
acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the de149
fendant acted with the required state of mind.
The statutory language of the PSLRA clearly requires plaintiffs to
plead fraudulent intent with particularity. 50 The language obviously
rejects the Ninth Circuit's pre-1995 standard to plead fraudulent intent generally. 151 However, the potential ambiguity with regard to
what facts are sufficient to give rise to a strong inference of the requisite mental state creates a problem. 152 The Third Circuit reasoned
that the PSLRA's close resemblance to the Second Circuit's "strong
inference" language demonstrates that Congress also intended to
completely adopt all of the pleading requirements outlined by the
Second Circuit.1 5 3 The Second and Third Circuits' approach adopts
the view that pleading facts alleging a motive and opportunity to commit fraud presumptively establishes the required element of
54
scienter.1
The Third Circuit concluded that Congress enacted the PSLRA
to establish a uniform pleading standard equal to the most stringent
prevailing standard of the Second Circuit while leaving the substantive
requirement of scienter unchanged.1 55 In other words, recklessness
remains sufficient to establish scienter, but this substantive standard
must be pled with particularity. The question remains whether pleading facts which allege motive and opportunity are sufficient to establish recklessness.
Another interpretation of the language of the PSLRA is that Congress intended to heighten the pleading standard to require allegations of scienter to be pled with particular facts giving rise to a strong
inference, while also intending to reject the motive and opportunity
presumption. 156 In Comshare, the Sixth Circuit noted that the PSLRA
149.

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) (Supp. IV 1998).

150.

See id.

151. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) with In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541,
1545 (9th Cir. 1994).
152. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999).
153. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 533-34 (3d Cir. 1999).
154. See id. at 534-35; Press, 166 F.3d at 538.
155. See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534.
156. See In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999).
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allows plaintiffs to plead facts that give rise to a strong inference of
recklessness, but not by simply alleging facts of motive and opportunity. 157 The Sixth Circuit noted that the PSLRA did not change the
substantive scienter requirement that a plaintiff must prove, but instead only changed the pleading requirements sufficient to sustain a
58
motion to dismiss.'
In Bryant, the Eleventh Circuit pointed out that the PSLRA
"makes no express mention of the motive and opportunity test developed in the Second Circuit, and certainly does not expressly codify
it."' 159 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the term "required

state of mind" clearly refers to a substantive standard, such as negligent, reckless, or intentional, and not a specific kind of evidence, such
as facts alleging a motive and opportunity. 160 As a result, allegations of
motive and opportunity may be relevant, but such allegations, without
more, are insufficient to demonstrate the requisite mental state. 16 1
While the Sixth Circuit in Comshare maintained a simple recklessness
scienter requirement, the Eleventh Circuit in Bryant seemingly elevated the substantive requirements from a simple recklessness standard to a severe recklessness standard. 112 This is supported by the fact
that the Bryant court expressly changed the language from recklessness to severe recklessness. ' 63 At the time of the Bryant opinion, the
Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits handed down opinions with the
reckless language and, instead of adopting this language, the Bryant
court presumably elevated the form of recklessness. The Eleventh Circuit's view is consistent with the intent of Congress in enacting the
PSLRA to deter frivolous lawsuits.
Given the recent case of Novak, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits'
interpretation of the statutory language is more accurate regarding
the sufficiency of pleading motive and opportunity. The Second Circuit appears to acknowledge that its view of recklessness is difficult to
distinguish from higher levels of negligence. However, the Sixth Circuit has not elevated the substantive scienter requirement to severe
recklessness.1 64 In light of Congress' policy of deterring frivolous law157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See id.
See id. at 548-49.
Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1285 (11th Cir. 1999).
See id. at 1286.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999).
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suits, a severely reckless standard, as adopted by the Eleventh Circuit
in Bryant, seems more consistent with the language of the PSLRA.
A third interpretation of the language of the PSLRA is that Congress intended to alter both the procedural and substantive requirements. 165 The Ninth Circuit adopted such a view in Silicon Graphics,16 6
in which it rejected the approach of inferring scienter simply from
allegations showing a motive and opportunity. 167 The court also elevated the substantive scienter requirement from a simple recklessness
standard to a deliberate recklessness standard-a standard very similar to intentional conduct. 168 Given the language and the views of all
the other circuits, the Ninth Circuit's decision to change the substantive requirement is unfounded. In the recent case denying a rehearing, dissenting Judge Reinhardt stated that the Ninth Circuit "was the
first to arrive at the remarkable conclusion that proving recklessness is
no longer sufficient" and that "[w]e did not start a trend.' 6 9 He also
stated that "every other circuit to have interpreted the PSLRA's pleading requirement had concluded that the statute did not overturn the
well-established, preexisting law governing the mental state required
17
to establish securities fraud."
Although the language of the PSLRA parallels the Second Circuit
pleading standard with respect to pleading facts constituting fraudulent intent with particularity, the extent to which Congress intended
to completely adopt the Second Circuit standard becomes clear when
7
looking at the legislative intent.' '
B.

Legislative History and the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998

Since the statutory language is silent as to what facts constitute a
strong inference of scienter and what the definition of scienter encompasses, the legislative history provides additional guidance. 172 The
legislative history demonstrates that the Bryant interpretation of the
165. See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 1999); In re
Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 1999), reh'g denied, 195 F.3d
521 (9th Cir. 1999).
166. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979.
167. See id. at 974.
168. See id.
169. In reSilicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 195 F.3d 521, 523 (Reinhardt,J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 522 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
171. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 531 (3d Cir. 1999).
172. See, e.g., Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977 (noting that in the absence of a clear
command in the text the court must turn to legislative history for guidance).
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PSLRA is most accurate-alleging a motive and opportunity to commit securities fraud does not alone establish a strong inference of scienter. 173 The Bryant court also correctly interpreted the substantive
requirements of scienter to include recklessness although its view encompassed a more stringent severely reckless standard than the Second Circuit standard.174
1. The House of Representatives
An initial version of the Securities Litigation Reform Bill'

75

("Re-

form Bill"), House Bill 10, was proposed in the House of Representatives to restrict abuses in securities class actions. 76 It would have
changed both the substantive and procedural requirements of the scienter element of Section 10(b) claims.' 77 This bill would have required that a complaint alleging securities fraud contain "specific
facts" establishing that the defendant acted with the requisite scienter. 178 In addition, this bill would have eliminated recklessness as a
basis for liability under the scienter element. 179 Limiting the scienter
to intent would drastically reduce the number of securities fraud cases
brought in federal court.
However, after hearings by the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, the bill was revised. 18 0 The revised bill,
House Bill 1058,181 reinstated recklessness as a basis for liability and
required the complaint to "make specific allegations, which, if true
would be sufficient to establish scienter as to each defendant at the
time the alleged violation occurred." 182 House Bill 1058 defined recklessness as follows:
[A] defendant makes a fraudulent statement recklessly if the defendant, in making such statement, is guilty of highly unreasonable
conduct that (A) involves not merely simple or even gross negligence, but an extreme departure from standards of ordinary care,
and (B) presents a danger of misleading buyers, sellers or security
holders that was either known to the defendant or so obvious that
the defendant must have been aware of it. Deliberately refraining
from taking steps to discover whether one's statements are false or
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See discussion infra Part III.B.1-3.
See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1285 (11 th Cir. 1999).
H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995).
See id. § 204.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. § 4 (1995).
H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. § 4 (1995).
Id.
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misleading constitutes recklessness, but if the failure to investigate
was not 1deliberate,
such conduct shall not be considered to be
83
reckless.
The House of Representatives passed House Bill 1058184 in March of
1995 by a vote of 325 to 99.185
2.

The Senate

The Senate also passed a version of the Reform Bill, which required plaintiffs to allege "specific facts demonstrating the state of
18 6
mind of each defendant at the time the alleged violation occurred."
In a report to the full Senate, the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs stated that "[t]he Committee does not
adopt a new and untested pleading standard that would generate additional litigation. Instead, the Committee chose a uniform standard
modeled upon the pleading standard of the Second Circuit."' 8 7 The
Committee added that the Second Circuit pleading standard, which
requires the plaintiff to plead facts that give rise to a "strong inference" of defendant's fraudulent intent, is "[lr]egarded as the most

stringent pleading standard."' 8 The Committee stated that it "does
not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this
pleading standard, although courts may find this body of law instructive."' 8 9 This means that the Second Circuit's motive and opportunity
prong showing recklessness was not adopted by Congress, but may be
relevant in the analysis of the sufficiency of the pleading.
During the Senate debate of the Senate version of the Reform
Bill, Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) proposed an amendment ("Specter Amendment") that codified both the Second Circuit's strong inference standard as well as the two alternative tests for establishing a
strong inference of scienter. 9 0 The amendment provided:
[A] strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind may be established either-(A) by alleging facts to
show that the defendant had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud; or (B) by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness by the
defendant.' 9 1
183.
184.

Id.
See 141 CONG. REc. H2863 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1995).

185.

See id.

186. S. 240, 104th Cong. § 104 (1995).
187. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See 141 CONG. Rrc. S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995).
191. Id.
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The Senate Bill, absent the Specter Amendment, passed on June 28,
1995 by a vote of 70 to 29.192
3.

House Committee of Conference: Statement of the Managers

The House Committee of Conference resolved the differences
between the House and Senate versions of the Reform Bill. 193 The
Conference Committee drafted the final version of the Reform Bill
utilizing part of the pleading standard of the Second Circuit and also
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 194 Since the Second Circuit
pleading requirement was regarded as the most stringent, the Committee adopted the Second Circuit requirement that the plaintiff state
with particularity facts that give rise to a "strong inference" of the defendant's fraudulent intent. 195 However, the Committee commented
that "[b]ecause the Conference Committee intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second
Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard."' 96 This means
that Congress did not codify the motive and opportunity prong. In an
accompanying footnote, the Committee expressly rejected the Second
Circuit case law interpreting the pleading standard by stating that "the
Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading standard cer97
tain language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness."
Concerned that the Conference Committee pleading standard
created a stricter standard than the Second Circuit, President Clinton
vetoed the Reform Bill. 198 President Clinton expressed his concerns
regarding the new pleading standard in a message to the House of
Representatives.' 99 In this message President Clinton stated:
I believe that the pleading requirements of the Conference Report
with regard to a defendant's state of mind impose an unacceptable
procedural hurdle to meritorious claims being heard in Federal
courts. I am prepared to support the high pleading standard of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit-the highest pleading standard of any Federal circuit court. But the conferees make
crystal clear in the Statement of Managers their intent to raise the
192.
193.
194.
195.

See
See
See
See

141 CONG. Rjc. S9219 (daily ed. June 28, 1995).
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 1 (1995).
id. at 41.
id.

196.

Id.

197.

Id.

198.

See 141

dent Clinton).
199. See id.

CONG.

REc. H15214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (citing veto message of Presi-
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standard
even beyond that level. I am not prepared to accept
2 00
that.
President Clinton did state that he would sign the bill if Congress
would "adopt the Second Circuit pleading standards and reinsert the
Specter amendment."20 1 By reinserting the Specter Amendment, it
would have become easier for plaintiffs to plead securities fraud. Despite the President's disapproval, both the Senate and the House of
Representatives overrode the President's veto and enacted the House
Committee version of the PSLRA into law in December of 1995, with20 2
out changes.
4.

Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 Reinforces
the Previous Purposes for Passing the PSLRA

Section 78u-4 specifically provides that the PSLRA's provisions
"shall apply in each private action arising under this chapter that is
brought as a plaintiff class action pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure." 203 Since the PSLRA only applies to actions filed in
federal courts, plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions avoided the
new pleading requirements by filing lawsuits in state courts under
state law. 20 4 As a result, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998205 ("SLUSA"). SLUSA requires plaintiffs to file in federal court those securities class actions which involve
nationally traded securities and which are based on similar allegations
of Section 10(b). 20 6 Congress, in its Conference Report on the
SLUSA, commented on the adoption of the PSLRA. 2 17 This Conference Report states that "[i] t is the clear understanding of the [Conference Committee] managers that Congress did not, in adopting the
[PSLRA], intend to alter the standards of liability under the
[SEA]."208 In a similar Senate Report, the managers emphasized that
Congress clearly did not intend to alter the scienter standard in federal securities fraud suits. 20 9 The Senate Report reiterated that the
200. Id. at H15215.
201. Id.
202. See 141 CONG. REc. H15223-24 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
203. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (1) (Supp. IV 1998).
204. See Daniel J. Kramer, Reforming the Securities Reform Act with NationalPleadingStandards,N.Y.LJ., July 22, 1999, at 1 (1999) (pointing out plaintiffs ability to avoid the PSLRA
by filing class actions in state court).
205. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb (Supp. IV 1998).
206. See id.
207.

See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-803, at 15 (1998).

208.
209.

Id.
See S. REp. No. 105-182, at 6 (1998).
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PSLRA establishes a heightened uniform federal standard of pleading
2 10
requirements based in part upon Second Circuit's holding in Press.
The Third Circuit has held that the PSLRA completely adopts the
Second Circuit pleading standards, while not imposing a more stringent scienter requirement beyond that enunciated in the Second Circuit-simple recklessness. 2 1' Since the legislative history is
contradictory and inconclusive, these circuits focus on the plain language of the PSLRA. 2 12 Courts adopting this view reason that since the
language of the PSLRA mirrors the language used in the Second Circuit, Congress intended to establish standards equal in stringency to
that of the Second Circuit.2 13 Thus, by refusing to expressly reject the
Second Circuit motive and opportunity presumption and simple recklessness substantive standard, Congress implicitly accepted these
approaches.
The Senate Committee Report does state that courts may find the
Second Circuit case law instructive when interpreting the PSLRA
pleading standard.2 14 Furthermore, it is argued that the adoption of
the Second Circuit test satisfies Congress' goal of curtailing abusive
securities actions.2' 5 In this context, "instructive" means that courts
are free to consider facts alleging a motive and opportunity as a factor
in determining whether the alleged facts give rise to a strong inference of intent.2 1 6 However, instructive does not mean that the courts
are required to accept allegations of motive and opportunity as a pre2 17
sumptive showing of scienter.
Some circuits disagree that the PSLRA completely adopts the Second Circuit pleading and substantive standards.2 1 8 Relying on the legislative history, these circuits argue that Congress implicitly rejected
some Second Circuit standards and explicitly stated its intention to
219
heighten the pleading standard above that of the Second Circuit.

Consequently, Congress could not have completely adopted the Sec210. See id.
211. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 532-33 (3d Cir. 1999).
212. See id. at 533-34.
213. See id; see also Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir 1999).
214. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995); see also discussion supra Part III.B.2.
215. See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534.
216. See, e.g., In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999).
217. See id. at 549.
218. See generally Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999); In re
Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec.
Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999), reh'g denied, 195 F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 1999).
219. See 141 CONG. REC. S9219 (daily ed. June 28, 1995); see also Conshare, 183 F.3d at
551; Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977-78.
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ond Circuit standards. 220 This view is supported by the Senate Committee Report, in which the Committee explicitly stated its intention
not to codify the Second Circuit case law interpreting the pleading
standard. 22' The House Committee Report, which explicitly states its
decision not to include certain language relating to motive, opportu222
nity, or recklessness, also supports this interpretation.
Additionally, the Senate rejected the proposed Specter Amendment, which would have adopted the motive and opportunity presumption used in the Second Circuit. 223 Finally, by overriding
President Clinton's veto, Congress manifested its intention to
heighten the pleading standard by rejecting the motive and opportunity presumption of the Second Circuit. 224 It is apparent that Con-

gress considered completely adopting the Second Circuit test, but
clearly declined to do so by deleting such language from the final ver22 5
sion of the bill.

IV.

The Solution

Congress' attempt to reform securities litigation in 1995 has
caused confusion among the circuits. Since the statutory language and
the congressional history of the PSLRA are ambiguous, the federal
circuit courts of appeal have interpreted the PSLRA in various ways.
These various interpretations are contrary to the goal of establishing a
uniform federal pleading standard that prevents abusive securities litigation. After analyzing the statutory language and legislative history,
the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the PSLRA is most consistent
with the language, history, and purpose of the PSLRA.
In Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc.,226 the Eleventh Circuit interpreted
the PSLRA to incorporate heightened pleading requirements beyond
that of the Second Circuit without altering the substantive requirements of scienter. 227 The Eleventh Circuit implicitly rejected the
mental state of simple recklessness by holding severe recklessness is
required to satisfy the scienter element of the PSLRA. 228 Requiring
220. See 141
F.3d at 551.
221.

CONG. REc.

H15223-24 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995); see also Comshare, 183

223.

See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995).
See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995).
See Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551-52; see also Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977-78.

224.

See Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551.

225.

See id.

226.

187 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999).

227.

See id. at 1285-86.

228.

See id. at 1284 n.21.

222.
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severe recklessness is most consistent with the definition of scienter
22 9
outlined in the United States Supreme Court decision in Hochfelder.
In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court held that negligence was an insufficient mental state to impose civil liability under Section 10(b) of
the SEA.23 : 1 The Supreme Court did, however, leave open the question
of whether recklessness is a sufficient mental state to establish scienter. 23 I The Supreme Court defined scienter as a "mental state embrac-

ing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."2 3 2 The Supreme Court
also added that "[i] n certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing
liability."233

In Bryant, the Eleventh Circuit correctly held that under the
PSLRA "a showing 'of severe recklessness' satisfies the scienter requirement."2 34 The court concluded that under the PSLRA the substantive requirements of scienter were unchanged since prior to the
enactment of the PSLRA reckless conduct was sufficient to establish
the requisite mental state. 23 5 However, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the requisite mental state must be at least severe recklessness, implicitly rejecting simple recklessness. 236 The key inquiry is whether the
conduct alleged is sufficiently greater than negligence. It is for this
reason that the Second Circuit's view of recklessness is subject to
abuse. Reckless conduct must be shown by facts amounting to more
than gross negligence.
Moreover, given the broad policy goal of curtailing abusive lawsuits, it follows that Congress intended to raise the pleading standards
uniformly. Presumably, Congress did not enact the PSLRA only to prevent abusive securities actions in the Ninth Circuit. 237 Therefore, in

order to curtail abusive suits nationally, the standard must have been
heightened to a level beyond the most stringent existing standards.
This means a scienter requirement of severe recklessness is what Congress intended with the PSLRA. Since the existing standard was a simple recklessness standard, a severe recklessness standard is the most
229. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976).
230. See id.at 193.
231. See id.at 194 n.12.
232. Id.
233.
I.
234. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1282 (l1th Cir. 1999).
235. See id.at 1284.
236. See id.at 1286.
237. Although there is an argument that the PSLRA was a response to the Ninth Circuit's loose interpretation of Rule 9(b), the real issue is the appropriate level of fraudulent
intent required to bring securities fraud actions.
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appropriate interpretation consistent with effectuating the goal of ensuring that plaintiffs file only meritorious securities fraud suits.
The Eleventh Circuit also correctly held that the PSLRA did elevate the pleading standard beyond that adopted in the Second Circuit. 238 Since the language of the PSLRA does not expressly mention

the motive and opportunity test, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the notion that allegations of motive and opportunity alone are sufficient to
establish scienter. 239 The Conference Committee Report and the Sen-

ate Report, which explicitly fail to adopt the Second Circuit approach,
support the Eleventh Circuit's view. 240 The Eleventh Circuit pointed
out that the language of the PSLRA does not support a motive and
opportunity test.2 4 1 The Eleventh Circuit correctly analyzed the term

"mental state" as a substantive condition of the mind and found that
the terms "motive and opportunity" indicate specific kinds of evidence
and do not constitute a requisite condition of the mind. 242 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the motive and opportunity test for
being too inclusive, as almost all corporate insiders have a motive and
opportunity to increase one's wealth through manipulation. 2 43 Since
Congress attempted to deter frivolous lawsuits nationally, the level of
recklessness must be elevated beyond the most stringent existing standards. For this reason, the appropriate level is a severe recklessness
standard, which cannot be alleged simply by showing motive and
opportunity.
Conclusion
In 1995, Congress adopted the PSLRA to curb abusive securities
litigation. Since its inception, courts have struggled with Congress' explicit goal to heighten the pleading requirement in securities fraud
cases. Some courts have determined that adopting the Second Circuit
standard, the most stringent standard prevailing at the time, satisfied
this goal. However, other courts have determined that Congress intended to elevate the pleading requirement beyond the Second Circuit standard. Based on the language and history of the PSLRA, a
severely reckless level of scienter is most consistent with Congress'
directives.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1283.
See id. at 1285.
See discussion supra Part III.B.3-4.
See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1285.
See id. at 1285-86.
See id. at 1286.
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In order to effectuate the purpose of the PSLRA, the United
States Supreme Court or Congress must resolve these issues and adopt
a uniform federal pleading standard for securities fraud actions. Using the Eleventh Circuit as a model, a heightened pleading requirement can be attained, while retaining recklessness as the substantive
scienter requirement. However, since plaintiffs must allege facts that
are distinguishable from gross negligence, a greater showing of recklessness is in order. This is the dilemma that the Ninth Circuit attempted to resolve in Silicon Graphics. The circuit courts need
assistance from the Supreme Court or Congress in defining the appropriate recklessness standard. Until these issues are resolved, our nation's securities markets are threatened by inconsistent court
determinations.

